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This chapter offers a historical and analytical introduction to the school of thought 
that views ‘development as freedom’.Since it is impossible to do justice to the depth and 
complexity of this ‘new’ approach to development in just one short chapter, I explore a 
few significant dimensions of the concept beginning with Amartya Sen’s pioneering 
contributions. I also look at clarifications by Nussbaum and others who offer a list of 
important functionings that can be included in the capabilities set. The subsequent part 
builds on this by exploring the transition from a utilitarian welfare economics to a fully 
social capabilities based ethics for development with justice. The present chapter 
proceeds in the direction of concretizing the idea of ‘development as freedom’ by 
discussing the role of a network of social, economic and political institutions in creating 
social capabilities. This   allows us to develop the argument that freedom is to be viewed 
dynamically as the development of appropriate social capabilities embedded in a specific 
network of social, economic and political institutions. The following section then 
presents an example of a concrete area of application--- namely, the problem of 
developing women’s capabilities as an important aspect of global justice--- in order to 
illustrate the practical relevance of the capabilities approach. The final, concluding 
section reflects on the future of the social capabilities approach as an evaluative 
framework for development theory and policy. It turns out that in addition to the usual list 
of capabilities, and policies driven by them in the field of development, a deep 
democratic constitution backed up by ongoing democratizing social and political 
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It is no less true of economics than in real life that fads and fashions have a 
peculiar hold on modern imagination. Perhaps the prevalence of such ephemeral fads and 
fashions led Robert Frost to proclaim in his poem ‘The Black Cottage’: 
 
…why abandon a belief 
Merely because it ceases to be true. 
Cling to it long enough, and not a doubt 
It will turn true again, for so it goes. 
Most of the change we think we see in life 
Is due to truths being in and out of favor. 
 
The rediscovery of a more ‘objective’ social capabilities perspective in 
development economics is a good case in point. The transition from classical Bentham-
Mill type of utilitarianism to a modern Paretian subjective utility was completely 
triumphant by the 1930s when Robbins launched his devastatingly successful challenge 
against interpersonal comparison of utility. Subsequent work by Bergson and Samuelson 
on social welfare functions attempted a new type of normative evaluation of economic 
states; however, Arrow’s impossibility theorem, at least in its initial trajectory, seemed to 
many to have destroyed the analytical basis for any normative welfare economics 
whatsoever. 
 
It was the brilliant analytical work of Sen in his Collective Choice and Social 
Welfare that raised a number of deep questions that led to a reappraisal of the whole 
utilitarian approach and eventually to the rediscovery of the capabilities approach. As Sen 
himself has graciously pointed out,
1his initial insights regarding capabilities came from 
reading Adam Smith. In a number of essays on poverty--- some of which came out from 
the ILO in about 1976--- Sen explored the ‘Smithian’ view that there are ‘functionings’ 
of individuals in society. Sen also showed that such functionings cannot be simply 
expressed as utilities without the risk of serious distortion and confusion. Subsequently, 
Martha Nussbaum has traced the Aristotlean connections of functionings and capabilities, 
and Khan has pointed out the Hegelian and Marxian elements in a fully social 
conceptualization of capabilities. 
  
Since the revival of the idea of capability, there have been empirical applications 
and an interest shown by policymakers who are serious about reducing poverty and 
increasing the well-being of people through the process of economic development. The 
most notable example is the idea of a human development index or the HDI, promoted by 
the UN. Although the correspondence between a rigorous conception of capabilities and 
the HDI is not exact, and conceptual problems remain, the reach of the concept has 
already gained broad appeal.  
                                                 
1 See H.A. Khan (1992), ‘A Conversation with Amartya Sen’, NYC: The Voice of Bangladesh.  5 
During the late 1980s and 1990s Sen explored further the connections between 
capabilities and ‘positive’ freedom. These explorations culminated first in a masterly 
monograph
2 and in 1999, a magisterial statement on development which, as Sen argued 
forcefully and imaginatively, is really (positive) freedom. 
 
This brief historical introduction cannot do justice to the depth and complexity of 
this ‘new’ approach to development. In the rest of this chapter, I intend to explore a few 
dimensions of the concept beginning with Amartya Sen’s pioneering contributions. This 
is the theme of the next section (section 2). In section 3, I look at clarifications by 
Nussbaum and others and offer a list of important functionings that can be included in the 
capabilities set. Section 4 builds on this by exploring the transition from a utilitarian 
welfare economics to a fully social capabilities based ethics for a just development. 
Section 5 goes further in the direction of concretizing the idea in a Hegelian sense by 
discussing the role of a network of social, economic and political institutions in creating 
social capabilities. This   allows us to develop the argument that freedom is to be viewed 
dynamically as the development of appropriate social capabilities embedded in social, 
economic and political institutions. The following section then presents an example of a 
concrete area of application--- namely, the problem of developing women’s capabilities 
as an important aspect of global justice--- in order to illustrate the practical relevance of 
the capabilities approach. 
The final, concluding section summarizes and reflects on the future of the social 




2.  THE PIONEERING CONTRIBUTIONS OF AMARTYA SEN 
 
 
One way to enter into a discussion of capabilities is via a critique of alternative 
approaches. Another, more positive and direct way, is to consider the meaning of 
normative concepts such as ‘equality. Here I will take the second, more direct route. 
In his preface to Inequality Reexamined, Sen himself is quite forthright: 
 
The central question in the analysis and assessment of equality is, I argue here, 
‘equality of what?’ I also argue that a common characteristic of virtually all the 
approaches to the ethics of social arrangements that have stood the test of time is 
to want equality of something---something that has an important place in that 
particular theory. Not only do the income egalitarians… demand equal incomes, 
and welfare-egalitarians ask for equal welfare levels, but also classical utilitarians 
insist on equal weights on the utilities of all, and pure libertarians demand 
equality with respect to an entire class of rights and liberties.
3(Italics in the 
original) 
 
                                                 
2 Sen 1992. Inequality Reexamined 
3 Sen 1992. Inequality Reexamined, p.ix.  6 
Sen’s answer to this question, ‘equality of what?’ is that what we need to equalize 
is not income or utility, but capabilities. His argument on the positive side proceeds from 
a recognition of individual diversities and the different abilities of particular individuals 
to convert income, resources or commodities to actual functionings. Here, it may be 
useful to distinguish between functionings and capabilities. Individual functionings are 
distinctive levels of doing certain things or living a particular aspect of life. For example, 
the level of nourishment or general state of health. Capabilities can be thought of as a set 
of all potentially available functionings that are achievable for a particular person with a 
certain amount of resources. A person may then choose a vector of maximal functionings 
from the set.
4 Thus, underlying the capabilities perspective is a respect for individual 
diversities. At the same time, the principle of equalizing capabilities, in Sen’s analysis of 
development leads to a policy of redistributing resources towards certain socially and 
economically disadvantaged groups--- women, in particular. 
 
Sen’s focus on diversity is quite clear. He states: 
 
…the diversity of spaces in which equality may be demanded reflects a deeper 
diversity, to wit, different diagnoses of objects of value--- different views of 
appropriate notions of individual advantage in the contexts in question….Liberties, 
rights, utilities, incomes, resources, primary goods, need-fulfillments etc., provide 
different ways of seeing the respective lives of different people, and each of the 
perspectives leads to a corresponding view of equality.
5 
 
The sheer beauty of Sen’s argument is that he then focuses on individual 
diversities to pinpoint the role of capabilities as a more encompassing and fundamental 
space in which inequality comparisons can and should take place. In a sweeping fashion 
capabilities are then connected with rights, justice and ultimately freedom.
6 
 
Just as wealth creation is to be judged by the yardstick of capabilities creation, 
poverty or deprivation in general is also redefined as not just inadequate income, but as 
more fundamental inadequacies of capabilities. Since poverty reduction is considered by 
some to be the central problem of development
7, it is worthwhile to discuss this further. 
 
There is by now a vast literature on measurement of poverty. Theoretically, the 
seminal paper was Sen’s 1976 axiomatization and the associated index that attempted to 
bring together the headcount ratio, the income gap ratio and income inequalities among 
the poor within a consistent axiomatic framework. Since then, as stated above, Sen and 
others following him have moved in the direction of a multidimensional approach to 
poverty as inadequate capabilities 
 
The general intuition behind poverty measurement is that ‘poverty’ exists when a 
                                                 
4 Or, to be more general and cover all possibilities consistent with mathematical set theory, there may be 
more than one best element as well. 
5 Sen.1992, p.25 
6 See Khan 1998, ch. 7 for a discussion and critique of some these positions and connections. 
7 Of course, not everyone agrees. See, for example, Hayami (2003).  7 
group of people in a particular society cannot attain a ‘minimum’ level of well-being. The 
‘minimum’ is at least partly dependent upon the prevailing standards of society. However, 
there are dimensions of well-being such as nutritional requirements that might actually 
constitute an absolute biological minimum. The idea behind absolute as opposed to 
relative poverty is that by using generally agreed upon minimum standards of well-being, 
we can, in fact, define an income poverty line. Such income poverty line gives the cut-off 
point below which everyone is deemed to be poor. The key questions in applying this 
idea of poverty for applied policy issues are: 
 
1.  How do we assess well-being? 
2.  How do we decide on a certain poverty line so that when a poor person 
crosses that threshold s/he is no longer poor? 
 
These are the questions which ask us to identify who the poor are. Therefore, this 
can be called, using Sen’s terminology, the “identification” of poverty. As a second step, 
the total picture of poverty is arrived at by aggregating. Hence, Sen’s coinage of the term 
“aggregation problem”. Head count ratio is one obvious example in which one simply 
counts the number of people below the poverty line and then divides this number by the 
total number of individuals in a particular society.  
 
In terms of identifying the poor through the setting of the poverty line, a number 
of issues can arise. The following four questions are one way of raising some these issues 
(Fields 2001): 
 
1.  Is the basis income or consumption, and how comprehensively will either one 
be measured? 
2.    What is the income-receiving unit: individual, family, per capita, or adult 
equivalent? 
3.  Will there be a single poverty line or will there be separate ones for urban and 
rural areas or different regions of the country? 
4.   Is the poverty line income determined scientifically, politically, subjectively, 
or as a matter of convenience? 
 
In terms of both identification and aggregation of poverty, the procedure depends 
partly on axiomatizing the concept of poverty so that any particular measure has a 
number of desirable properties. The most common axioms are focus, anonymity, 
population homogeneity, monotonicity or strong monotonicity, and distributional 
sensitivity. Among the commonly used indexes, the head count ratio fails both the strong 
monotonicity and distributional sensitivity axioms. Converting the various axioms from 
the space of income to the space of capabilities makes comparison more difficult 
although, as seen above, the approach is conceptually appealing.
8 
 
Sen (1999) suggests several ways of comparing capability information as a way 
out of such difficulties. First, there is the direct approach. One might be able to examine 
                                                 
8 For a discussion of some of these problems see Sen (1992,1999), Khan and Sonko (1994) and Khan and 
Parvin (1984),   8 
directly the vectors of functionings and capabilities. In some cases, if one is lucky a total 
comparison ranking all such vectors of functionings and capabilities with respect to one 
another in terms of poverty may be possible. However, in many instances one may not be 
so lucky. Even then, a partial ranking of some vectors of functionings and capabilities 
compared with the others may be possible. Finally, one may wish to emphasize a 
particular dimension such as health. Sen calls such exercises ‘distinguished capability 
comparison’.
9 Notice that if the particular dimension chosen is income, then we are back 
to comparing income poverty. 
 
Secondly, there is the supplementary approach. The supplementary approach 
makes use of standard traditional procedures of comparison in income space. However, 
such comparisons are supplemented by information on functionings or capabilities. An 
example will be the augmentation of the World Bank’s one or two dollars a day poverty 
analysis with information on longevity, literacy, women’s status etc. 
 
Finally, a third approach which is more ambitious than the supplementary 
approach relies on the notion of some adjustment to income. Sen mentions that’… family 
income levels may be adjusted downward by illiteracy and upward by high levels of 
education.’ In his work connecting environmental damage with inequality and poverty, 
Khan (1997) uses a concept of adjusted income where a monetary equivalent of 
environmental damages is subtracted from everyone’s income. He then goes on to show 
that even if these damages are distributed equally--- a conservative ‘equality of 
misfortunes’ assumption--- under the standard axioms of inequality and poverty 
comparisons both inequality and poverty as measured under the adjusted income 
distribution is in almost all cases larger than in the unadjusted case. Thus this third 
approach, called the indirect approach by Sen, can be of use as well. 
 
It seems reasonable to conclude from the above discussion that in spite of some 
measurement problems, the concept of capabilities as advanced by Sen, could be 
operationalized, at least partially. There were, however, some need for further conceptual 
clarification of the initial formulation of capabilities as well. This is where the 
contributions of Nussbaum and others become relevant. I now turn to a brief discussion 
of these and some related issues. 
 
 
3.  CLARIFICATIONS BY NUSSBAUM AND OTHERS: CONNECTIONS 
WITH ARISTOTLE, HEGEL AND MARX 
 
 
In a number of influential and insightful contributions Martha Nussbaum has 
developed an Aristotlean interpretation of capabilities. The connections between 
capabilities and a distinctly Aristotlean conception of human flourishing are indeed 
striking. Later in this section I will discuss a list of general capabilities drawing upon 
both Sen and Nussbaum. The Aristotlean connections, I hope will become quite clear 
through this exercise in comparison and contrast. 
                                                 
9 See Sen (1999), pp.81-85  9 
 
In Technology, Development and Democracy, I have pointed out some Hegelian 
connections as well. In particular, the Hegelian conception of freedom as an interactive 
arrangement in society where concrete institutions of family, civil society and state all 
play definite roles seem a specifically modern way of viewing the possibilities and limits 
of human flourishing in a liberal society based on private property. Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right is a landmark contribution, in this sense, to the elucidation of the problem of 
freedom in modern societies. 
 
If we turn now to the equally interesting thesis of Gilbert (1990) that Marx was an 
Aristotlean in his critique of alienation, it can be seen that such a conception of the theory 
of alienation supports the emphasis on the capabilities as non-alienated set of qualities 
that are potentially attainable, but may actually be by and large unachievable under the 
existing institutional arrangements. Gilbert points out that in some parts of Capital Marx 
“… compared productive activity in general with labor under capitalism in a purely 
Aristotlean way.” Marx’s characterization of Milton’s labors on the Paradise Lost as self-
motivated, non-alienated labor and his contrast of such labor with that of a hack writer 
who writes only for the money he receives from the capitalist publisher underlines the 
good of genuine life-affirming labor. Ironically, in real life under capitalism and in 
bourgeois political economy Milton’s labor is ‘unproductive’
10  while the hack is a 
‘productive’ wage-laborer.  
 
In Capital, Marx shows how the accumulated dead labor in the form of capital 
dominates workers. Workers are mere means of further accumulation. Under the sign of 
capital death dominates over life and denies the workers the necessary opportunity to 
realize their potential to be free, creative beings. As Gilbert points out, Marx’s seemingly 
nonmoral starting point of analyzing commodities ultimately leads to a moral critique of 
capital as a social relation. Interestingly, a qualitative labor theory of value (QLTV) that 
is being currently developed by a group of thinkers who are of Hegelian orientation as 
well would seem to imply such a moral critique as well.
11 In particular, going beyond 
abstract labor means recognizing the use value/exchange value distinction as emerging in 
a historically specific, alienated and alienating mode of production. Going beyond such a 
distinction ultimately means going beyond the value form itself in the political economic 
sphere, or rather more broadly, a transvaluation of values
12 in a society of the future that 
can result from a transformation of capitalist social relations historically. 
 
Taking the QLTV as the central explanatory framework and connecting it with 
eudaemonism can also help illuminate Foucault’s important insights about the societies 
of discipline and control that form a part of his critique of modernity. From this point of 
view such developments are consistent with the reproduction of the value form under the 
domination of capital. Foucault shows how the discipline of the army served as the model 
for discipline in the factory. In fact, for Foucault, virtually every institution is permeated 
                                                 
10 That is, under the strict assumption that no wage payments were made. 
11 Gilbert (1990) ch. 7. 
12 The Nietzschean language is intentional. A radical interpretation of both Marx and Nietzsche can find 
much that is in common in ethics between these two revolutionary thinkers of the nineteenth century.  10 
with this disciplinary mode of functioning until a more subtle and manipulative system of 
control can be developed. 
 
Foucault’s concept of bio-power
13 is a particularly powerful way of characterizing 
how the production and reproduction of life itself can become an object of control under 
capitalism. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault analyzes in detail how the human body 
can be objectified. The fundamental goal of the disciplinary power was to create a “docile 
body”. At the same time, this docile body also needed to be a productive body. Looked at 
from the perspective of QLTV, this implies nothing less than the total alienation of flesh 
and spirit. Once again, the problem from the human point of view---in spite of the 
ironically avowed “anti-humanism” of early Foucault----then becomes: how to overcome 
this alienation?  
 
We now turn to this problem. If, as I have argued so far, the abolition of 
alienation requires the abolition of capital as a relation of domination, can QLTV throw 
any light on how to abolish capital as a social relation? Could capabilities then be 
reconstrued in a more radically critical way by following this Aristotlean-Hegelian-
Marxian connection? In the rest of this chapter, I show that this can be done and explore 
the further implications of this move for development theory and policy. In what follows, 
I first give a characterization of capabilities following Sen, Nussbaum and others. I then 
discuss the fully social and political nature of these capabilities. 
 
  Capabilities can be construed as general powers of human body and mind under 
specified social, economic and political structures that can be acquired, maintained, 
nurtured and developed.  They can also (under circumstances such as malnutrition or 
severe confinement) be diminished and even completely lost.  I have emphasized 
elsewhere the irreducibly social (not merely biological) character of these human 
capabilities.  Sen himself emphasizes "a certain sort of possibility or opportunity for 
functioning” without always carefully specifying the institutional setting. 
 
  In order to assess the critical reach of such a fully social capabilities perspective 
we need to go further and try to describe more concretely what some of the basic 
capabilities may be.  David Crocker has given an admirable summary of both 
Nussbaum's and Sen's approach to capabilities in a recent essay.  Mainly relying on 
Nussbaum but also on other sources (shown below), he has compiled a list that is worth 
reproducing here: 
 
  Basic Human ‘Social’
14Capabilities (N and S stand for "Nussbaum" and "Sen", 
respectively; the quoted items come from Nussbaum unless otherwise noted). 
 
                                                 
13 See Foucault (1978, 1980, 1994) and Dreyfus and Rabinow (1992). Foucault’s debt to Nietzsche as far as 
the exploration of biopower among other things, through a genealogical study is concerned, has been 
acknowledged by Foucault himself. 
14 My usage of social is akin to Gilbert’s (1990) use of ‘social’ in social theory. Important political features 
are also included in the category of ‘social’. However, as above, I will use ‘social and political’ also to 
underline the salience of both political ideas and practices.  11 
1.  Capabilities in Relation to Mortality 
1.1.N and S: "Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, so far as is 
possible 
1.2.  1.2. N: Being able to be courageous 
 
2. Bodily  Capabilities 
2.1. N and S: "Being able to have good health. 
2.2.   2.2.  N and S: "Being able to be adequately nourished. 
2.3. N and S: "Being able to have adequate shelter 
2.4.   2.4.  N: "Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction" 
2.5. N and S: "Being able to move about from place to place 
 
3. Pleasure 
3.1.N and S: "Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain and to have 
pleasurable experiences 
 
4. Cognitive  Virtues 
  4.1.  N: "Being able to use the five senses" 
  4.2.  N: "Being able to imagine" 
  4.3.  N: "Being able to think and reason" 
  4.4.  N and S: "Being acceptably well-informed
/ 
 
5.  Affiliation I (Compassion) 
  5.1.  N: "Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves" 
  5.2.  N: "Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude" 
   
6.  Virtue of Practical Reason (Agency) 
  6.1.  N: "Being able to form a conception of the good 
           S: "Capability to choose
 ; "ability to form goals, commitments, values 




7.  Affiliation II (Friendship and Justice) 
  7.1.  N: "Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for 
other  human  beings,           to engage in various forms of familial and social 
interaction" 
  7.1.1.  N: Being capable of friendship 
          S: Being able to visit and entertain friends 
  7.1.2.  S: Being able to participate in the community 
  7.1.3.  N: Being able to participate politically and being capable of justice 
 
8. Ecological  Virtue 
  8.1.  N: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and 
the world of nature" 
   
9. Leisure  12 
  9.1.  N: "Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities" 
  
10. Separateness 
  10.1.  N: "Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's 
  10.2.  N: "Being able to live in one's very own surroundings and context" 
  
11. Self-respect 
  11.1.  S: "Capability to have self-respect" 
  11.2.  S: "Capability of appearing in public without shame" 
 
12. Human  Flourishing 
  12.1.  N: "Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted 
by natural possibilities" 
  12.2.  S: "Ability to achieve valuable functionings" 
 
  As Crocker correctly points out, we can facilitate this ordering by requiring 
that ‘… it might be better for practical rationality and affiliation to "infuse" but not 
"organize" the other virtues.’ Crocker contrasts Nussbaum's approach with Sen's.   
Sen's and Nussbaum's lists differ at a few points.  For Sen, the bodily capabilities and 
functionings are intrinsically good and not, as they are in some dualistic theories of 
the good life, merely instrumental means to other (higher) goods.  In interpreting 
Aristotle, Nussbaum distinguishes between bodily functionings that are chosen and 
intentional, for instance, "chosen self-nutritive and reproductive activities that form 
part of a reason-guided life" and those that are non-intentional, such as digestion and 
other "functioning of the bodily system in sleep".   
 
Furthermore, Nussbaum has included items such as "being able to have 
attachments to things and persons outside ourselves" and "being able to live with concern 
for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature", for which Sen has no 
counterparts.  These items are welcome features.  Item 8, "ecological virtue", is an 
especially important addition to Nussbaum's outlook.  In a period when many are 
exploring ways of effecting a convergence between environmental ethics and 
development ethics, it is important that an essentially anthropocentric ethic "make room" 
for respect for other species and for ecological systems.  Worth considering is whether 
Nussbaum's "ecological virtue" is strong enough.  Perhaps it should be formulated to 
read: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and nature as 
intrinsically valuable."  Item 9 injects some appealing playfulness in a list otherwise 
marked by the "spirit of seriousness."  What explains the presence of these items on 
Nussbaum's list, their absence on Sen's list, and, more generally, the more concrete 
texture often displayed in Nussbaum's descriptions?  One hypothesis is that the 
differences are due to Nussbaum's greater attention to the limits, vulnerabilities, and 
needs of human existence.  Further, it may be that Nussbaum's richer conception of 
human beings derives from making use of the story-telling imagination far more than the 
scientific intellect."  On the other hand, Sen helpfully includes the good of self-respect, a 
virtue that enables him to find common ground with Rawls and to establish links with the  13 
Kantian ethical tradition, in which moral agents have the obligation to respect all persons, 
including themselves, as ends-in-themselves . 
 
  Both Sen and Nussbaum agree, however, that these capabilities are distinct and of 
central importance.  One cannot easily trade off one dimension of capability against 
another.  At most, one can do so in a very limited way.  They cannot be reduced to a 
common measure such as utility. 
 
  As Crocker points out, "capability ethic" has implications for freedom, rights and 
justice going far beyond simple distribution of income considerations.  If one accepts the 
capability approach as a serious foundation for human development, then it follows that 
going beyond distributive justice is necessary for a complete evaluation of the impact of 
economic policies.  
 
 
  In evaluating any policy regime --- for instance international financial regimes 
and national economic policies under globalization --- from this perspective not only do 
we wish to pose the question of efficiency but also the whole set of questions regarding 
human freedom.  In particular, the positive human freedom to be or to do certain things.  
Thus, creation of markets and efficient production by itself would mean very little if it led 
to a lopsided distribution of benefits.  Worse yet, if markets and other institutions led to 
phenomena such as reduced life expectancy, increased unemployment, reduced 
consumption levels for many and deprivation for certain groups such as women and 
minorities then they will not even be weakly equitable global economic structure.  On the 
contrary, under such circumstances, the global markets and other financial institutions 
will be strongly inequitable from the capability perspective. 
 
It is because of this perspective that the existing positive analysis of the problems 
of global financial markets and institutions need to be put in a completely transparent 
“social capabilities” framework.
15 Such a framework is openly normative and makes a 
strong ethical case for helping the disadvantaged increase their capabilities towards 
achieving equality of capabilities. Thus, for instance, poorer nations and poor people in 
the global economy deserve a special ethical attention within any proposed global 
financial architecture. As Khan (1998) shows in the context of adopting innovation 
structures leading to increased productivities, ultimately the aim of any increase in 
productivity needs to be the increase of freedom. Such freedom, as Sen (1999) points out 
has both an instrumental value and an ultimate value. Instrumentally, freedom as social 
capabilities can lead to a further increase in productivity. Thus even a hard-nosed, 
efficiency driven analysis must address this aspect as an empirical issue. Therefore, an 
Aristotlean interpretation of Sen- Nussbaum conceptualization of capabilities can go a 
long way towards a social democratic regime of development as freedom, and this is 
much to be applauded. However, pushing the concept of social capabilities in the Hegel-
Marx direction of overcoming alienation by achieving freedom as a concrete universal 
                                                 
15 See Khan (2004, forthcoming) for advocating an approach in this spirit with regards the role of 
globalization. Khan (1997) applies this framework to an evaluation of trading regimes from the point of 
view of economic justice in Africa in particular.  14 




4.  FROM UTILITARIAN WELFARE ECONOMICS TO A SOCIAL 
CAPABILITIES BASED ETHICS 
 
The utilitarian tradition in economics, as Sen correctly reminds us is based on 
three distinct components. One of these is consequentialism. All choices of actions, rules, 
institutions etc. must be judged by the consequences of the particular choice made. In this 
sense, consequentialism is merely results oriented. It does, however, rule out purely or 
exclusively rights- based or deontological decision rules. A second constituting element 
of utilitarianism is what Sen has termed ‘welfarism’. According to Sen welfarism 
‘…restricts the judgments of state of affairs to the utilities in the respective 
states…’Combining welfarism with consequentialism, one can derive the proposition that 
‘…every choice must be judged by the respective utilities it generates.’ 
 
Finally, the third element, namely, sum-ranking of utilities imposes an 
aggregation scheme whereby utilities of different people can simply be summed together 
without bothering about their distribution over the entire population. This neatly sidesteps 
who gets what; but it is clearly the greatest good under the three conditions when utility is 
the only good to consider. Notice that Robbins attacked the classical utilitarian idea of 
interpersonal comparability and by implication sum-ranking of utilities in the 1930s. But 
the alternative, radically subjective view of personal utility also sidesteps the issue of 
distribution. No two Pareto optimal states are, strictly speaking, comparable. In general 
equilibrium theory the second theorem of welfare economics merely states that under a 
suitable redistribution of initial endowments, every Pareto optimal state can be achieved 
as a competitive equilibrium. However, there is no bias towards---or, for that matter, 
against--- an egalitarian distribution. 
 
What Sen’s more radical critique of utilitarianism and his replacement of utility 
with capabilities have done is to change the paradigmatic terms of discourse. It is no 
longer necessary to debate the various meanings of utility and what the distribution of 
utilities should be. The talk about utilities has been replaced by talk about positive, 
concrete freedoms, as the Sen-Nussbaum list of capabilities above demonstrates.  
 
With this radical shift of the terrain of discourse, however, there is also a set of 
new questions that arises. What are the social, political and economic conditions under 
which capabilities are best promoted for all the people in an equalizing direction. Both 
the levels and distribution of capabilities are important. Perhaps responding in an indirect 
way to earlier criticisms Sen has outlined the ‘perspective of freedom’ more definitely. 
Freedom is important both for evaluative and for effectiveness reasons. Evaluation of 
societies by the actual amount of substantive freedoms enjoyed by people is radically 
different from using utility, procedural liberty, real income etc. Effectiveness reason rests 
on Sen’s claim that freedom enhances the ‘agency’ of the individual leading to greater 
individual initiative and social effective social participation. Thus freedom can be viewed  15 
as both the primary end and the principal means for development. Sen also gives a five 
fold classification of instrumental freedoms as consisting of political freedoms, economic 
facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security. In the rest 
of this section I argue that a perspective of global ‘deep democracy’ consistent with Sen’s 
characterization of freedom leads us to a consistent critique of the existing political and 
socioeconomic arrangements globally. Following the enlightenment project as formulated 
by Kant, and the critique of Kantian understanding by Hegel, and finally, the ‘this-sided’ 
worldly critique of Hegel by Feuerbach and the dialectical critique of Feuerbach’s 
onesided materialism by Marx takes us to a questioning of the existing institutions when 
these fail to promote and equalize social capabilities. The theory of ‘deep democracy’ 
captures many of these concerns. 
 
Building on both the contributions of classical thinkers from at least Rousseau 
onwards, but also on modern theories of participatory and strong democracy advanced by 
scholars such as Barber deep democracy advances the thesis of equalization of 
capabilities as a central concern of global economic justice. Most important from this 
perspective is the work by scholars such as Alan Gilbert (1990) on radical democracy that 
is internationalist and welcomes mass activism. 
 
Extending the important earlier work of Gilbert, Khan (1992, 1993a,b; 1995, 1998, 
2004a,b) in a number of essays and books establishes the claim of equalizing social 
capabilities along with global justice as central elements of a sufficiently rich conception 
of democracy which respects the rights of citizens underlying the core concept of 
democracy. Conceiving rights following Sen as ‘goal rights’ is one way to defend the 
centrality of capabilities. Another way is to view these rights--- most importantly, the 
right to self-determination--- as self-sustaining if and only if movement towards 
equalization of capabilities can be sustained globally. Extending Gilbert’s cluster 
conditions for democracy
16  Khan (1992, 1998) establishes that three clusters are of 
particular significance. The political cluster begins with formal democratic principles of 
universal suffrage and elections, but does not stop there. Although this ‘formal 
democracy’ must be defended vigorously, it is seen as one aspect of a deeper form of 
democracy that various polities are moving towards. 
 
In order to gain insight into these deeper form, we need to ask what conditions 
can sustain freedom which is the core idea underlying democracy. The answer is that as 
soon as freedom is conceived positively and not just as mere absence of coercions, 
capabilities come to the fore. However, probing deeply into the project of enhancing and 
equalizing the capabilities of citizens even in a rough, practical sense economic and 
cultural conditions come to be seen as crucial. For example, education, including critical 
ethical and political education is recognized as of utmost importance. In so far as 
democratic movements for a just society have been schools for political education--- say, 
starting with at least the political movements from 17
th century onwards including major 
movements in the 20
th century and the new social movements of this century--- these are 
not just disruptive moments, but are complex struggles where much political learning 
about freedom takes place. Thus deep democracy will necessarily involve a continuous 
                                                 
16 see also Kateb (1984).  16 
engagement with the past, present and future of the democratic movements in a pluralistic 
context. Periodic individual and mass nonviolent civil disobedience movements will of 
necessity be part of a deep democratic agenda. 
 
Economically, the provision of leisure time for both personal private interest and 
the exercise of citizenship responsibilities will be necessary. Work place democracy is 
also a salient condition, since production is socially necessary and will occupy a certain 
amount of time for all able bodied and mentally competent adults. The capabilities 
literature has not always been clear on this point. However, it is logical to think that a 
person’s capabilities will suffer deprivation if working conditions do not allow discussion, 
participation and ‘ownership’ of work conditions. The literature on flat organizations in 
knowledge economy generally makes a case for the newer ‘intellectual’ labor to be 
treated in this way; but the social capabilities approach leads to the conclusion that all 
work in organizations large and small should be treated this way so that work place 
alienation can be overcome without necessarily using labor saving capital-intensive 
technologies. 
 
Overcoming alienation also requires a vibrant culture where artistic and other 
forms of individual and collective expressive activities are as open as possible. 
Capabilities in this dimension are vital for the protection of democratic values and 
practices, since these also involve internalization of mutual respect, integrity, tolerance 
and creativity. It can also be seen that using the advances in cognitive, social psychology 
and some schools of psychoanalysis capabilities can be further advanced through a 
therapeutic approach to social problems. A ‘postmodern’ insight is also the need to 
recognize the limits to certain types of economic growth. As Daly and others have 
pointed out the scale of production counts in a globalized, interdependent planet in a 
significant way. Ecological issues will often require a just global democratic procedure 
for deliberation and policymaking. In short all of the cluster conditions---political, 
economic and cultural--- require a theory of global justice as an underpinning and 
justification. 
 
Khan (1998) has proposed such a theory in the context of a postmodern world by 
building on elements of Rawls and Sen. In brief outline the structural forces in the global 
economy push towards integrating markets and regions. However, many markets are 
embedded in national economies; there are also non-market aspects of social and cultural 
lives of people that are threatened. As a result we find the contradictory phenomena of 
McWorld and Jihad (Barber, 1995). The creation of a genuine global society, which 
many see as the ultimate outcome of globalization then necessitates meeting the 
requirements of global justice. Khan (1998) mentions at least 5 areas, where the norms of 
global justice must evolve (among others): 
 
1.  International trade and monetary regimes: The current asymmetric system 
of payments which penalizes the deficit countries by forcing only them to 
bear the costs of adjustment needs to be made a global burden sharing 
institution. The World Trade Organization, similarly, needs to 
acknowledge the historical imbalances in the world trading system. For  17 
example, specialization according to static comparative advantage may 
lock the developing countries in a relatively backward situation in the 
emerging global division of labor. 
 
2.  International capital flows:  From the perspective of many people in the 
developed economies capital flight to LDC’s (with or without free trade 
agreements) may constitute a barrier to well-being, at least in the short-run. 
At the same time foreign direct investment in LDCs may create only low-
wage, marginal jobs (Wood, 1994). A just approach to FDI must consider 
the effects on both the north and south in terms of self-determination. A 
controlled capital flow accompanied by improvements of wages and 
working conditions in the south may be the most desirable solution. 
 
3.  International ecological considerations: Global interdependence has been 
increasingly recognized in this area. However, it is not clear what justice 
demands in terms of the relationship between the north and south. Other 
things being equal, the enforcement of strict environmental standards 
would seem to be just. However, such standards may destroy the 
livelihood of some people in the south, it is sometimes argued. A global 
tax and transfer scheme would seem to be the precondition for applying a 
global set of environmental standards. The transfer of ecologically sound 
technology systems from rich to the poor countries is a precondition for 
justice in this sphere. 
 
4.  Asset redistribution and human development: Much of the foregoing 
discussion pinpoints the need for giving people the economic wherewithal 
in order for them to develop their social capabilities. Most studies (e.g., 
Adelman and Robinson, 1978; Khan, 1985; James and Khan, 1993) have 
discovered that non-redistribution of assets to the poor hampers poverty 
alleviation strategies. Redistributing assets and developing their human 
capital so that the poor can have access to markets becomes a major 
necessity in our normative framework. In most parts of the world this will 
require structural reforms rather than marginal policy interventions. 
 
5. Gender  justice: The impact of globalization on women will have to be 
assessed carefully. The well-documented facts regarding gender 
inequalities that so far have affected women’s capabilities negatively 
demand unequivocally that policymakers pay careful attention to 
enhancing (or at least not decreasing) women’s capabilities. Will the 
globalization help women to overcome social limitations ranging from 
lack of nutrition to limits on participation in social, economic and political 
life? Unfortunately, the answer is unclear. In so far as many developing 
country women do not possess skills for the global market place, 
globalization is already hurting them. 
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  These five examples are meant to be illustrative only. By no means do they 
exhaust all the pertinent issues in moving towards a just economy globally. (For example, 
we could add or highlight the growing rural/urban disparities with globalization and its 
implications for justice). But they do illustrate both the problems and prospects for justice 
in the age of globalization. One of the major political problems we have not discussed so 
far is the weakening of national sovereignty that the call for global economic justice 
entails. Agreeing to a global mode of production and distribution constrained by the 
principles of justice does mean surrendering considerable authority to international 
agreements, conventions, and ultimately, perhaps to new international organizations. It 
should be observed, however, that even without the constraining role of justice the 
globalization process weakens national sovereignty, even for advanced industrialized 
countries (e.g., NAFTA). Thus, the call for a just economy must confront this (as well as 
other issues such as weakening of traditional cultural modes of living) head on in the 
light of reasonable principles. The fundamental message is that among these principles 
that of freedom as rational autonomy of the individual must be the principal one. This is 
one rational (perhaps the only one) approach if we are to avoid both the Scylla of Jihad 
and the Charybdis of McWorld. 
  
The McWorld aspect of globalization is a result of a fractured but real economic, 
financial and technological integration. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement in the early 1970s, the financial market (including interest rates and exchange 
rates) was deregulated, thereby enhancing the flow of capital between nations. Until then 
the world financial system was governed by the Bretton Woods agreement of 1945 which 
provided for fixed exchange rate where currency values were expressed in terms of 
dollars and gold. When the system was abolished in 1971 by the Nixon administration 
and replaced by a floating exchange rate, the grounds for a global market were laid. 
 
This was reinforced by the resurgence of a neoliberal free-market ideology of 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation that became the "only game in town" 
following the ascendance of political conservatives -- Reagan in the U.S., and Thatcher in 
Great Britain. It was further reinforced by the collapse of the former socialist countries 
and the emergence of the neoliberal thinking as a dominant and unchallenged school of 
thought (Falk, 1997). All these factors created a conducive environment for the free 
movement of goods including capital goods, and services as well as finance, thereby 
seemingly creating an integrated global economy.  In the following section we discuss the 
main causes of this contradictory but nonetheless integrating moment in the world 
economy. However, an alternative set of policies that can address the problems of slow 
growth and external payments while promoting the equalization and enhancement of 





5.  THE ROLE OF A NETWORK OF INSTITUTIONS IN CREATING 
SOCIAL CAPABILITIES: FREEDOM AS THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL 
CAPABILITIES EMBEDDED IN INSTITUTIONS  19 
 
 
From our normative analysis so far it would appear that a nuanced, broad 
consequentialism of the sort Sen advocates --- ‘a goal rights system with consequence-
based reasoning’---is superior to a narrow deontological view of rights and freedom such 
as Nozick’s. But the modern Hegel-Marx connections push us further in the direction of a 
critical assessment of institutions and the need for radical institutional change if 
necessary. The necessity for such changes is obvious in predatory regimes such as the Pol 
Pot regime in Cambodia, or Saudi Arabia under corrupt princes. But a wide range of 
institutional changes are necessary even in formally democratic regimes such as India, or 
Bangladesh. 
 
The central point about deep democracy is that it is a network of institutions, and 
not just an agenda for piecemeal reforms. Although individual reforms are welcome and 
to be supported vigorously, a movement for deep democracy must advocate deeper, 
systemic changes along with the specific reforms that people are fighting for at any given 
moment.  Therefore, the role of the new social movements is, from this perspective, 
positive and encouraging; but in order to be fully effective, these movements must have a 
deep democratic agenda and fight for it openly. 
 
The network of social. political and economic institutions necessary for 
promoting such well-being freedoms and agency freedoms as are necessary for the full 
self-determination can be both historically and culturally specific. However, they must 
involve the provisioning of adequate amount of resources and safeguards. Along with the 
constitutionally liberal guarantees of physical safety and freedom from arbitrary coercion, 
there must be positive guarantees of being able to pursue a political life of citizenship that 
gives social and political opportunities to all. In the age of globalization, this implies, 
ultimately, that nothing short of a global charter of rights for all humans with 
implementing institutions at both international, national and local levels are called for. 
 
This may seem hopelessly utopian to many. Therefore, let me observe that the 
strategic positioning of fighting for a global citizenship does not negate the many small, 
local struggles for extending well-being and agency freedoms, but rather the strategy is 
predicated upon active participation in whatever capacity it is possible, across the 
national boundaries in these myriads of ongoing struggles. The more farsighted people in 
the anti-globalization movements around the globe are already moving in this direction. 
The positive policy changes from above for promotion of the capabilities of the 
disadvantaged in particular--- by the International Financial Institutions, developed 
country governments and developing country governments--- are always welcome 
developments; however, the partial and limited nature of these policy initiatives need to 
be recognized. It is also doubtful that without mass democratic movements from below 
even limited reforms from the above will be forthcoming. 
The economic struggles for better wages and working conditions in both domestic 
and transnational firms are of great significance in the age of globalization. The social 
capabilities will remain greatly stunted even under conditions of full employment if  low 
wages and dangerous, unhealthy working conditions are the norm. A more radical step  20 
which is consistent with the logic of development as freedom is the overcoming of 
domination in the work place.
17 Such struggles for the overcoming of domination in the 
work place can then be connected with the broader democratic movements around the 
world. 
 
The important point that emerges from this perspective is that freedom is positive, 
concrete and dynamic. It is positive in the sense of alerting us to the need for promoting 
social capabilities. It is concrete in two senses. One is the concreteness in the 
identification of specific functionings and capabilities that the ‘development as freedom’ 
approach calls for explicitly. The second concrete aspect--- here freedom is finally, a 
‘concrete universal’ in Hegel’s terminology--- is the absolute necessity to embody social 
freedom in concrete, interrelated, historically specific social, political and economic 
institutions. It is dynamic in the sense that such institutions and to some extent, the idea 
of freedom itself may undergo further changes in the direction of promoting further 
capabilities as the future unfolds. In the next section, a concrete illustration of this idea is 
attempted by looking at the problems of women’s capabilities. 
 
6. WOMEN’S CAPABILITIES PROMPTION AS A SPECIAL POLICY 
IMPERATIVE: PRESENT TASKS AND A MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE 
FUTURE 
 
Within this project of promoting global ‘deep democracy’ through the progressive 
equalization and enhancement of social capabilities defended above, certain items such as 
ecological justice, sharing of wealth across borders and gender justice have proved to 
have both logical and normative salience. Here, I develop one theme--- namely, the 
problem of developing women’s capabilities as an important aspect of global justice--- as 
an example to illustrate the practical relevance of the capabilities approach. 
 
Here, too, the two important modern pioneers are Sen and Nussbaum. Sen’s   
Inequality Reexamined has an important chapter on Gender and Capabilities. Sen has 
contributed to a rigorous examination of the connections between gender and capabilities 
both conceptually and through empirical work in collaboration with others. Women, 
Culture  and Development--- Nussbaum’s edited volume with Jonathan Glover as the 
coeditor--- is another landmark contribution to the field of gender and development. 
Nussbaum (2000) is also a most illuminating contribution, but here I will focus on the 
pioneering 1995 edited volume for the most part. Incidentally, Nussbaum (1995) also 
takes issue with certain relativist postmodern criticisms of ‘essentialism’ and defends an 
Aristotlean ‘essentialist’ conception of capabilities here as well. Jonathan Glover 
contributes a balanced and judicious essay defending ‘reasonable’ interventions while 
avoiding ‘policy imperialism’ from above. There is also an important essay by Sen on 
gender inequality and theories of justice in the third part of the book. 
 
The book begins with a concrete case study of women’s right to employment in 
India and Bangladesh based on her fieldwork by Martha Chen. Apart from the editors, a 
number of different perspectives on methodology and foundations of conceptualizing 
                                                 
17 See McCamant(2003) for a discussion of domination and unequal exchange.  21 
women’s equality are presented. For example, Onora O’Neill presents a vigorous case 
against using preference satisfaction as the normative criterion in economics. She couples 
this with an equally vigorous defense of the capabilities approach. She is, however, a 
Kantian and weaves skillfully the capabilities approach with a form of the Kantian 
principle that we not act on principles that can not be acted upon by all and argues that 
such a Kantian principle can serve as a valuable test for viable social policies. Her 
arguments result in showing that victimization, ‘by violence, by coercion, by intimidation, 
is simply unacceptable. Inter alia, this is also a powerful condemnation of the 
victimization of women. 
 
I have already mentioned David Crocker’s meticulous essay on the concept of 
capabilities. Hilary Putnam also defends a pragmatic approach close to John Dewey’s 
position that there could be a rational basis for articulating and holding onto an ethical 
position. Although, as Linda Alcoff points out in her comments, some feminists have 
followed philosophers such as Nietzsche and Foucault in order to criticize the kind of 
‘rationalistic’ approach Putnam defends, the point that democratic processes are 
necessary in Putnam’s argument seems to be intact. In my defense of a deeper form of 
democracy, I have emphasized the need for respecting differences, and the role of power 
and desire as well, without making the last two items either epiphenomena or 
overwhelmingly arbitrary. Indeed, the recognition of the ‘Dionysian’ aspects of human 
nature leads to the need for a structure and procedures for democracy that will both 
protect individuals from tyranny and promote their social capabilities in an interactive, 
causally reciprocal and efficacious manner. 
 
Respecting differences among cultures does not preclude a consideration of cross-
cultural standards of justice. This is an important conclusion drawn by Seyla Benhabib in 
the Nussbaum-Glover volume. There are internal debates within each culture about 
justice, as Sen and others have also pointed out. There may be sufficient common ground 
among seemingly different cultures in their critical and reflective discourses on ethics and 
justice. This points to the possibility of discussing women’s capabilities from a global 
and objective perspective. There are a number of other essays--- conceptual and 
empirical--- including the highly relevant and important essays in part iv which give 
regional perspectives on women’s equality from China, Mexico, India and Africa. 
 
From matters of basic functionings such as health and survival to issues related to 
political voice--- in short, the whole spectrum of functionings related to self-
determination--- there is by now compelling recorded evidence of discrimination against 
women almost everywhere in the world. In developing countries, along with general 
discrimination, there are also important regional variations. Even with great poverty, sub-
Saharan Africa shows less gender discrimination in basic health matters than the wealthy 
Indian state of the Punjab, for example.  This also allows us to illustrate the severity of 
such discrimination in some Asian countries in particular. 
 
For example, the female-male ratio in sub-Saharan Africa is 102.2 to 100. The 
same ratio for many Asian, Latin American and North African countries is much lower--- 
in fact the female percentage is less than male percentage. In order to dramatize the issue,  22 
Sen has expressed this gap as the absolute number of ‘missing women’. Following this 
approach, in the 1990s, the number of missing women in Southeast Asia was 2.4 million; 
in Latin America it was 4.4 million; in North Africa, 2.4 million; in Iran, 1.4 million; in 
China 44 million; in India 36.7 million; in West Asia, 4.3 million. 
 
According to Dreze and Sen (1989), in India there are more girls dying than boys, 
i.e. mortality rates are higher for the girls. Additionally, the mortality rates are higher for 
women than men in all age groups until the late 30s. As Chen, Nussbaum and others have 
pointed out, income poverty alone cannot explain this tragic fact. Social and political 
arrangements including what commonly goes under the names of customs and culture are 
also implicated. The limits of cultural relativism become apparent in such a defining case 
as women’s mortality. Increasingly, the women and the poor themselves are speaking out 
and asking for solutions (Narayan 2000). 
 
Does this imply that ‘enlightened’ policy makers and ‘foreign aid’ workers 
including the NGOs have the moral right to impose their policies on the women in poor 
communities? Far from it. What we really need are new institutions inclusive of women, 
led by them locally and working cooperatively with the other democratic institutions. In 
other words, promotion of deep democracy at the local level with active participation and 
leadership from local women is a necessary condition. 
 
It is also an implication of this type of policy and institutional approach that a 
serious attempt must be made to collect and interpret the relevant information regarding 
the functionings and capabilities of women. Indicators such as life expectancy, females as 
a percentage of total population and other demographic data are, needless to say, as 
relevant as ever. Social indicators for education and rights to participate in social life are 
also crucial. But, in addition, political indicators of democratic rights and democratic 
participation are of great importance. Only when women have the rights and are actually 
participating at all levels of political organization, and indeed leading many of them, is it 
possible to claim that positive political freedoms for women are an actuality. 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS: THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH AS AN EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 
 
At the end, we must recognize both the ontological basis for a social capabilities 
approach to development as freedom and its normative and practical policy implications.  
The subtle humor and irony of the Frost fragment at the beginning, of course, is that the 
poet really does not believe that what is fashionable is true. Rather, one needs to be 
suspicious of current fashions because they may simply be fads based on an enthusiasm 
for imitative behavior, and not the truth. Hence, the ontological and epistemological 
status of concepts are always worth contesting. This is why I have tried to defend the 
concept of social capabilities in my book Technology, Development and Democracy in a 
nonfoundational and presuppositionless way. 
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Furthermore, as the pioneering work of Sen and Nussbaum, among others, have 
shown elegantly, there are many philosophical defenses of the basic capabilities approach. 
The more important real world issue at this juncture is to make the many policy 
implications of this approach subjects of debate and discussion. This is already happening 
to some extent. I have mentioned the human development index and its various 
refinements.
18  There are also periodic conferences at various universities around the 
world to discuss theoretical advances and applications of the capabilities approach.  
WIDER (World Institute for Development Economics Research) has an ongoing 
research agenda that corresponds quite closely to the social capabilities approach. One 
hope that emerges out of all these activities is that policy makers in the International 
Financial Institutions and the various regional and national organizations will attempt 
seriously to implement a social capabilities-based approach. Two most important areas 
are poverty reduction and women’s deprivation.
19 Needless to say, these are related areas. 
These do not cover all of the applicable areas, but are paradigmatic in the sense that the 
clear and present relevance of the approach logically leads to an agenda for action 
ranging from income transfers, public and private employment creation to political 
freedom and activism.  
 
  One broad area of practical application, as even the International Financial 
Institutions move away from the so-called Washington Consensus is the design and 
implementation of alternative structural adjustment policies or SAPs. Basically, the 
conventional SAPs focus on short to medium run results regarding inflation and balance-
of-payments equilibrium.
20  In the case of many impoverished economies privatization 
itself may have become a goal for structural reform.  Likewise, market-making can also 
become a goal in itself.  Not enough recognition has been accorded to the economic side 
effects such as unemployment or (at least a temporary) lowering of output.  Social 
dimensions of adjustment came to be recognized even later.  The status of vulnerable 
groups such as women, children, or the poor do not often figure explicitly in these 
programs. From the arguments presented in this chapter it seems that in order to design a 
capability-enhancing alternative SAP (ASAP) the following elements must figure 
prominently: 
 
(1)  A clear recognition of the status of the different socio-economic groups in 
developing countries in terms of their economic and overall level of well-being.
. 
 
(2)  A list of priorities in terms of economic and social goals must be prepared.  In the 
case of incompatibilities of some of these goals, the question of trade-offs must be 
raised and resolved explicitly rather than implicitly through the logic of the 
market. 
 
                                                 
18 See also WHO(2001) for health-related applications. 
19 See Khan (2004c) for a discussion of economy wide modeling of SAPs in the context of poverty 
reduction and capabilities enhancements. 
20 In Khan and Sogabe, “Macroeconomic Effects of IMF Adjustment Policies” we have attempted a 
statistical evaluation of the impacts of the IMF programs for a large number of LDCs. 
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(3)  In particular, issues of fair inter-regional allocation of resources or opportunities 
must be addressed explicitly. 
 
(4)  Human development indicators based on the capability framework must become 
an integral part of ASAP. 
 
(5)  As our discussion in the previous section shows, the record of developing 
countries with regards to gender disparities is not flattering.  Therefore, gender-
justice must become a central part of ASAP -- not a peripheral issue to be ignored 
or to be resolved later after enough growth has taken place. 
 
(6)  As alluded to in the brief discussion of ecology, environment, and sustainable 
development, with ecological effects of adjustment included, must become the 
conceptual center of thinking about SAPs in these economies. 
 
(7)  It follows then that ecological and distributional issues need to be explicitly 
addressed in any such program.  This implies that there will be a need for careful 
inter-disciplinary studies on probable impacts of a policy package before its 
implementation.  It also implies the need for follow-up studies in order to assess 
the after-effects of a SAP. The crucial aspect here from the perspective of 
development as freedom is to ascertain which substantive freedoms are enhanced 
or diminished and then to assess their overall significance. 
 
Looking further beyond the current economic problems with SAP, we might ask if 
the freedom-centered perspective of development will survive. For not only is the world 
divided between the rich and the poor, there are also dark and destructive political and 
cultural forces ranging from arms race to global terrorism. Indeed, it will be naïve to 
pretend that recognition of what is good will automatically lead to that good. Here again, 
the argument cannot stop at simply establishing the validity of the ‘development as 
freedom’ approach, but it must furnish grounds for thinking that there is a fighting chance 
of ‘getting there’. The emphasis here on both achieving constitutional guarantees of 
freedom and on the need for an ever vigilant politically aware and active mass democratic 
movement will, I hope, focus attention on the crucial political and cultural aspects of 
equalizing capabilities. Without a vigorous, self-aware and self-critical democratic 
movement that genuinely respects social individuality and its all around development the 
approach ‘development as freedom’ can only be just another academic discourse. The 
substantive approach to social capabilities underlined in this chapter gives us hope that 
combining a critical theory with all around social practice and movement from below will 
make ‘development as freedom’ an achievable project in our lifetime.  25 
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